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Long‑term disabilities suffered by patients with severe 
traumatic brain injury (TBI) are a continuous challenge 
for health care systems and a burden for patients, their 
families, and the community in terms of suffering, 
disability, and monetary cost.[13,19] Approximately 50% 
of TBI comatose patients with an abnormal computed 
tomography (CT) scan also have high intracranial 
pressure (ICP).[22] Death, vegetative state, and severe 
disability are the expected outcomes in patients with 
persistent high ICP not controlled by medical and/or 
surgical treatment. As high ICP cannot be estimated 
reliably by clinical examination or even sequential 
imaging, ICP monitoring has been considered a necessary 
tool for its diagnosis and management.
After decades of ongoing debate about how and when 
to monitor ICP, a consensus was finally reached in 
1995 with the publication of the first evidence‑based 
guidelines (EBGs) for the management of severe TBI 
in adults, developed under the sponsorship of the 
Brain Trauma Foundation (BTF).[3] Three consecutive 
versions of these guidelines have established–as a level II 
recommendation–that ICP should be monitored in “all 
salvageable patients with a severe TBI and an abnormal CT 
scan”.[3,30] BTF guidelines are endorsed by most scientific 
societies worldwide and they have been translated into 
many languages and disseminated and applied in the 
United States, Europe, South America, China, and Japan, 
thus defining the core principles for managing severe 
TBI. In keeping with the guidelines, care centered on 
ICP management is the standard for patients with severe 
TBI in both developed countries and those developing 
countries that can afford their costly management. A few 
studies have shown that good adherence to the BTF 
guidelines improve outcomes and reduce the cost of the 
acute care.[12,16,24,26]
The recent publication of the Benchmark Evidence 
from South American Trials: Treatment of Intracranial 
Pressure (BEST TRIP) trial in the New England 
Journal of Medicine (NEJM) changed this calm 
scenario unexpectedly, particularly because some of 
the investigators coauthoring the paper were also 
active contributors to recent versions of the BTF 
guidelines.[7] This randomized clinical trial (RCT), 
which enrolled 324 patients in 6 hospitals in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, reported as its main conclusion that ICP‑based 
management increased the 6‑month favorable outcome 
only by a marginal and nonsignificant 5% difference 
when compared with patients for whom care was guided 
with serial CTs and clinical examination.[7] Despite some 
clarifications by the principal investigator,[6] the main 
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message conveyed by this trial is that ICP monitoring 
does not make an outcome difference when managing 
TBI.[14] Consequently, the debate of whether or not ICP 
should be monitored has been effectively resuscitated and 
it is receiving wide media coverage and generating more 
heat than light among clinicians.[14] Some neurosurgeons 
and intensivists would even like to have a moratorium 
until class I evidence is obtained for ICP monitoring.
BEST TRIP is a good example of research that has no 
practical relevance to the health needs of the host 
country, but it is apparently important to the foreign 
sponsors and researchers and therefore it provides a 
good opportunity to raise the issues of double standards, 
external validity, exploitation of vulnerable populations, 
the role of personal and clinical equipoise, and the value 
of biomedical research itself. There is a growing ethical 
concern for the obvious and hidden risks of conducting 
certain clinical trials in poor and low‑income countries. 
These trials are frequently funded by pharmaceutical or 
medical device companies and approved by prestigious 
regulatory bodies that are based in Western Europe 
or the United States, countries where some of the trial 
designs and medical practices employed in these poorer 
countries would never be permissible.[8]
HOW MUCH EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
DEFEND, SUPPORT, OR CHANGE CURRENT 
CLINICAL PRACTICE?
The answer to this question depends on whether 
a fundamentalist, conservative, or liberal view of 
the EBM principles is taken.[20] For busy clinicians, 
EBGs are a convenient way to cope with information 
overload syndrome, to remain updated in their fields 
of interest, and to build a common framework for 
mutual understanding when patients are managed by 
different specialists.[10] Policy‑makers and payers may 
use some reproducible results to formulate guidelines 
for implementing legitimate cost‑control strategies in 
a health care scenario with finite resources. However, 
RCTs–the cornerstone of EBM–were designed to test 
the effectiveness of new treatments, rather than the 
accuracy of any diagnostic or monitoring tool, and it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that extrapolating RCT 
methodology to the study of these tools is, at the very 
least, controversial and most likely inappropriate.[27,32] 
A rigid application of the EBM rules would force us to 
abandon all monitoring methods, even harmless pulse 
oximetry, as well as most therapeutic strategies used 
in neurocritical patients, because no RCT has proven 
that certain monitoring methods or treatments improve 
long‑term outcome.[1]
While we may remove the few monitors that are being 
used in low‑income countries, we could never do this 
in developed countries, where any anesthesiologist or 
intensivist not using, for example, pulse oximetry, may 
face a malpractice claim should an unexpected adverse 
event occur, even if no robust evidence exists to show 
that pulse oximetry positively affects outcome. The 
BTF guidelines support ICP monitoring in severe TBI, 
even if the available evidence is less than perfect. In 
this scenario, is it necessary to raise the evidentiary 
bar for ICP monitoring? Many of us are satisfied with 
the level of certainty obtained so far and, as a direct 
consequence of the BTF’s strong commitment to 
disseminate clinical practice standards, there is lack 
of clinical equipoise worldwide regarding the need 
for research on this topic. Most ethical review boards 
in developed countries would consider it unethical to 
conduct such a trial.
The wave of discussions generated by the BEST TRIP 
trial raises legitimate questions about who defines 
evidence, as well as who benefits from the findings. 
Why did different stakeholders decide to design 
and fund this controversial trial? In the case of the 
sponsoring company, it is obvious that a positive 
trial would have increased the sales of ICP probes 
in emerging economies and, therefore, would have 
increased company profits. However, what were the 
motives of the National Institutes of Health and the 
academic investigators for conducting such a trial? 
Should we accept that their main interest lay only in 
raising the level of evidence? We strongly see this as 
a naïve conclusion, which, for many of us, produces a 
certain amount of skepticism.
In a recent paper discussing who assigns value to the 
biomedical research enterprise and how that value is 
assigned, Dresser remarks that lobbying, politics, and 
commercial interests have too much influence over 
what is studied and why.[11] Dresser also emphasized 
that investigator conflicts of interest–whether declared 
or not–may distort the goals of biomedical research. 
Most physicians conducting clinical research and 
participating in research agendas (ourselves included) 
are employed by institutions where research projects 
are encouraged. In these institutions, research 
achievement and scientific output measured by 
different metrics (i.e., papers published in journals 
with high impact factors, citations, etc.) are mandatory 
for academic and clinical promotion, and sometimes 
help to increase investigator salaries. Participation 
in a multicenter, multinational RCT is a potential 
source of research funding in developed countries and 
sometimes a personal source of income for clinical 
investigators worldwide, because physicians in many 
industry‑sponsored clinical trials are rewarded financially 
to enroll patients. Under these circumstances, can 
physicians maintain their independence and avoid the 
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conscious or unconscious biases that can seduce them 
to participate in industry‑funded clinical trials?
THE ELASTIC CONCEPT OF CLINICAL 
EQUIPOISE
Genuine uncertainty regarding the benefit or harm 
involved in a certain treatment among clinicians or 
within a community of specialists–in other words, 
personal and clinical equipoise–is a necessary ethical 
condition to enroll patients in a RCT in which 
treatment is selected by chance.[4] Clinical equipoise 
is a disagreement among the community of expert 
clinicians and is a much more robust concept than 
personal or individual equipoise defined as the 
legitimate, honest certainty, or the lack of it, of the 
treating physician.[15] When there is a lack of clinical 
equipoise, is it acceptable to conduct an RCT with 
practitioners who are in personal equipoise in another 
country? BEST TRIP’s investigators, claimed that “the 
identification of a group of intensivists in Latin America 
who managed severe TBI without using available 
monitors and for whom there was equipoise regarding 
its efficacy”, eliminated this ethical constraint.[6] We 
consider this statement debatable, to say the least. In 
a globalized world, in which complex relationships 
exist between domestic and global research production, 
clinical equipoise must be also a global concept. What 
is the reason for conducting a particular clinical trial 
in a low‑income country, when the same trial design is 
considered unacceptable in a developed country?
Apart from the issue of equipoise, the author’s 
justification might be that, either in Bolivia or Ecuador, 
patients with a severe TBI would have not received ICP 
monitoring anyway, so the BEST TRIP investigators 
were only observing the outcome of patients that had 
never been monitored in the absence of any clinical 
trial. The investigators can argue that, as an added 
value, the patients in the control group received a 
well‑designed, protocol‑based management. However, this 
flawed argument was also used for the justification of a 
controversial RCT conducted in Africa to test the efficacy 
of a short‑course of zidovudine in hopes of reducing 
perinatal transmission of human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV). This trial raised considerable public 
awareness and expert concern after its publication in 
the NEJM.[2,21] The design and implementation of the 
zidovudine trial (an antiretroviral drug used for the 
treatment of HIV) has been criticized by many authors 
with strong scientific and ethical arguments. One of 
the strongest arguments was raised by Marcia Angell, 
former editor of the NEJM.[2] The main ethical issue 
regarding the NIH‑ and CDC‑sponsored short‑course 
zidovudine trial was the fact that 15 of the 16 trials used 
placebo controls, when long‑term zidovudine treatment 
had been accepted already as the standard of care for 
HIV‑infected pregnant women in the US, and evidence 
existed that this treatment significantly reduces the 
birth of children with HIV. The use of placebos would 
have been denied by any ethical committee if the trial 
had been conducted in any developed country, but the 
anticipated benefits of the study caused NIH and CDC 
officers to consider it ethically acceptable to conduct it 
in third‑world countries. Many have compared this trial 
to the Tuskeegee trial, in which African American men 
from rural Alabama were not treated for syphilis–when 
penicillin was already available–in a study designed to 
understand the natural evolution of the disease.[2] We 
face a double‑standard scenario when a clinical trial is 
unacceptable in the sponsor’s country but is encouraged 
and funded in developing countries, where trial costs 
are at least 50% less, the legislation controlling human 
research is less strict, and research protocols are seemingly 
accepted and implemented more easily and more quickly. 
As Angell remarked, in this setting, neither informed 
consent nor institutional review approval is a guarantee 
for patient protection.[2]
In the case of BEST TRIP, randomizing one‑half of the 
patients to a control group without ICP monitoring 
would not have been approved by any EU country 
or by the US. As an ethical imperative, research 
conducted in vulnerable countries and populations 
must follow the recommendations published by the 
Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS), which establishes that participants 
in clinical research must receive the same protection 
they would receive in the sponsoring country. CIOMS 
explicitly states that populations and communities 
with limited resources participating in clinical 
research “…are, or may be, vulnerable to exploitation 
by sponsors and investigators from the relatively wealthy 
countries and communities”.[5,17] An alternative and 
more ethically robust design for the BEST TRIP trial 
may have involved some of the US Level I and Level 
II trauma centers that do not routinely monitor ICP in 
severe TBI patients.
WE HAVE THE DATA, NOW WHAT? THE 
NEGLECTED ISSUE OF EXTERNAL VALIDITY
When new data challenging the current clinical standards 
of the most developed countries have been obtained, 
even if the ethical approach is questionable, what 
should be done? Most papers concentrate on evaluating 
the internal validity to verify that the methodology is 
sufficiently robust and that systematic bias has been 
avoided. However, less has been said about the external 
validity, that is, to what extent the results of a trial can 
be extrapolated to a population of patients in another 
setting.[9,25] Concerns about the internal validity of BEST 
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TRIP have been discussed already by others, and we 
fully agree with their analysis.[18] However, the extreme 
health care inequalities between the sponsor and host 
countries raise serious concerns about this trial’s external 
validity and, therefore, its scientific value. The trial was 
conducted in Ecuador, a country with a per annum 
(p.a.) health expenditure per capita (HEPC) of US $616 
in 2013, and in Bolivia, with an even lower p.a. HEPC 
(US $250).[31] The 2013 infant mortality rate (IMR)–the 
best estimator to reflect the quality of health care–was 
18.5 per 1000 live births in Ecuador and 39.8 per 1000 
live births in Bolivia, the latter of which is comparable to 
that in many Sub‑Saharan African countries.[23,31]
Can the results of a trial conducted in poor countries be 
generalized to the US or to any developed country? The 
US has the highest HEPC in the world–US$ 8608 p.a.–
and an IMR of 5.9 per 1000 live births,[31] and mortality 
for severe TBI is 21% higher in middle‑ and low‑income 
countries compared with high‑income countries.[8] The 
last figure is based only on those patients who arrive alive 
to hospital, and does not include the unknown number 
of victims who experience a TBI but are never admitted 
to a hospital. To implement complex management 
schemes, can we generalize data from trials conducted in 
countries with an inadequate or nonexistent emergency 
transportation system, where patients are managed in 
general intensive care units, in trauma centers with 
limited resources and a staff of doctors trained for a 
few months only? Can the results be compared with 
those from patients managed in specialized neurocritical 
units with high‑tech medical equipment? We believe 
the answer is plain: The only way to determine whether 
these results can be generalized to different health care 
settings is to replicate the study in accredited trauma 
centers–or equivalent settings–in a developed country, 
although, paradoxically, these countries would never 
allow such a trial to be conducted.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS. THE NEED TO 
RAISE THE BAR OF INTERNATIONAL 
ETHICAL STANDARDS
As recently remarked, the health care industry‑
manufacturers of drugs, devices, and medical equipment 
and its associated political and lobbying power, heavily 
influence strategic directions in clinical research. They 
may intervene, through experts with disclosed or silenced 
financial industry ties, in clinical guideline formation and 
dissemination, and may ultimately affect daily clinical 
practice.[29] The industry’s interests are not necessarily 
aligned with the interests of patients and society[29] 
and may lead to study participant injury or harm and 
also reduce the public’s trust and confidence in clinical 
research. So what is the solution to the issues we have 
raised in this essay? It is obvious that the growing number 
of clinical trials conducted in vulnerable countries 
requires commitment from all stakeholders to ensure 
adherence to a core of internationally accepted ethical 
principles that reflect one of the basic ethical premises 
of the Declaration of Helsinki; that is, that the interests 
of science and society are not an excuse to conduct 
clinical trials in vulnerable countries. Transnational 
clinical research should be controlled by internationally 
accredited ethical review boards, and research protocols 
rejected in one country should not be given permission 
to proceed elsewhere.[21] In addition, international human 
research monitoring agencies should have “…the power 
to sanction corporations and research groups that fail to 
respect universal standards”.[28]
While these mechanisms are implemented, the role of 
major journals publishing the results of RCTs is crucial. 
This is because, as Smith emphasizes, when results are 
published in a major journal, the study receives “…the 
journal’s stamp of approval”, the published results carry a 
kind of professional approbation, and the paper becomes 
more attractive to both the readers and media, who 
may amplify the real value of the results.[28] Traditional 
peer‑review processes used by journal editors to aid in 
deciding which papers are worth publishing is not capable 
of filtering some of the more sophisticated techniques 
of covered marketing and conflicts of interest. The 
incorporation of ethicists in the peer review process would 
likely help to raise red flags and to properly consider the 
routine statement that the study was accepted by the 
“human review board” of some prestigious university. 
By rejecting suspicious ethical studies, editors may not 
be able to help make the world a fairer place, but they 
will help in building a healthier scientific community 
and sending a clear message, to both scientists and the 
industry, that it is unacceptable to exploit and potentially 
harm a few people for the sake of many.
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Commentary
In “is intracranial pressure monitoring still required…” 
the authors argue that the provision of “first world” care 
to only a portion of “third world” patients in a research 
study is inherently unethical, the results are inapplicable 
to the “first world,” and the treatment violates the 
equipoise about the treatment by the providers in cases 
where they have not routinely rendered the available 
treatments in the past.
Distributive justice, applicability, and equipoise are three 
of the major girders underlying research ethics, implicitly 
a reason‑based endeavor. The issues that the authors raise 
are worthy of consideration and careful evaluation.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distributive justice in a research context is manifested by 
the idea that the population placed most at risk by an 
experiment should also be the population that stands to 
benefit the most from an increase in knowledge.
The authors use the BEST TRIP trial of intracranial 
pressure monitoring as a springboard to introduce a 
discussion and indictment of the bioethics of many 
international trials. Ironically, the two studies that they 
used to disparage international trials, BEST TRIP and 
Zidovudine, are both trials which arguably most benefitted 
the local community by minimizing invasive care. In one 
case, the equivalent efficacy of a more minimalistic and 
therefore more affordably available approach, and in the 
other case the utility of a perinatal medication, which 
could be easily and inexpensively administered in an 
epidemic area of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
were proven not just useful but equivalent to “first world” 
care. In their targeted recipient populations, the research 
groups mimic the courage of the North American gay 
community using itself as test subject in the early HIV 
trials, and the use at Willowbrook of an extremely at risk 
population for the evaluation of a Hepatitis vaccination.
In an environment where the availability of what is 
considered “first world” care is commonly not available, 
truly informed consent and access to (what is believed 
to be) an enhancement of the local standard of care may 
be felt by some to provide adequate moral justification 
for a research protocol. The clear moral hazard is that this 
will lead to the provision of deliberately substandard care.
Lifeboat ethics refers to forced choices imposed by 
limited resources rather than any uncertainty regarding 
the optimal courses of action in ideal circumstances. 
Regions where lifeboat ethical constraints are a routine 
reality present particularly, and dangerously, fraught moral 
issues in the consideration of any research project or 
medical treatment. Consider access to limited numbers 
of ventilators in isolated hospitals, the ethics of the 
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distribution of organ transplants, and battlefield and 
flood triage, to name but a few forced choice examples.
The counter argument from realists is that the provision 
of what may be considered to be a suboptimal level of care 
is still better than the local standard of care, and that this 
therefore provides adequate moral justification for such 
local studies. The idealist argues that this perspective 
obviously risks, and arguably imposes, the treatment of 
research subjects as tools rather that individuals, means 
rather than ends. From either perspective such a double 
standard is an inherently ethically suspect, if not an 
ethically taboo action, toward the individual patient.
It must also be remembered that the obligation of the 
researcher to discover the truth, is distinct from the 
obligation of the physician to provide what he believes to 
be the optimal available care. At the same time, it is the 
physician’s role as an agent of the patient which gives the 
physician the moral standing to treat the patient in the first 
place, and the role of researcher has no inherent right to 
either access to, or the trust of, the patient. To the extent 
that the researcher “hitchhikes” on the privileges assumable 
by the physician, he is at risk of acting duplicitously, as is 
the physician who permits this blurring of these distinctions.
This distinction will be revisited in the discussions of 
equipoise and reason.
APPLICABILITY
The generalizability of research results to a broader 
population is always an issue in research design, 
execution, analysis, and discussion. Sample selection 
and validation prior to the initiation of any study, and 
post hoc analyses of representativeness are legitimately 
raised by the authors. A full consideration of these issues 
beyond the scope of this comment. Statistical validation 
and generalization from a subpopulation is always a 
difficult issue, particularly insofar as the subpopulation 
may not be representative of anything but itself. This 
does not invalidate the results themselves, as long as the 
tested population is fully and accurately described, but 
may limit the utility of the results.
EQUIPOISE
The authors define equipoise as “(g) enuine uncertainty 
regarding the benefit or harm involved in a certain 
treatment…” Regarding equipoise, the authors argue 
that clinical equipoise should be global, “among the 
community of expert clinicians.” I would argue that 
this is impossible, as equipoise can, in the end, only be 
local, in the senses both that comfort with an evaluation 
or trial can exist by definition only within a particular 
circumstance, and by a particular physician/researcher.
Equipoise in this context has two elements, a superficial 
and a deep.
In the superficial, the argument is implied by the authors 
that for the specific population of physicians and patients, 
if the physicians had access to the presumed “superior” 
treatment for their patients, they would choose it. This is 
despite the fact that the local physicians stated that they 
were in equipoise regarding the treatment (potentially 
suspect, but who is to gainsay). Second, if in fact the 
physicians were maximizing the care of their local patients 
by undertaking a lifeboat triage, is this not their role: To 
maximize their available care to their patients? Better to 
treat one than none, even if this tilts the scales from the 
researcher toward the physician. It should not invalidate 
the results, unless it causes a further sub‑selection of the 
research population.
Finally, we must consider the deep paradox of equipoise. 
The deep paradox of equipoise in clinical research is its 
false rationalism. The peculiarity of research, in fact, is 
that no one will (or should) undertake research without 
an opinion that they can make things better, in aggregate, 
for the population or subgroup at issue, and therefore 
true, knowledge based, equipoise about outcome is 
impossible regarding the control arm of a study. It is the 
very uncertainty of this opinion that makes an objective 
equipoise impossible to establish or implement before the 
fact. That is, ethical researchers must be of the opinion 
that what they’re offering is, overall, an improvement 
on the current status quo, particularly for the subgroup 
studied. The hedge words “opinion,” “things,” “better,” 
“aggregate,” “population,” and “subgroup” are all 
deliberate and open to clarification in any particular 
circumstance, but belief must tilt the scales of opinion to 
the performance of the study.
In the end, opinion, upon which equipoise is based, 
is in turn based on either knowledge or belief or some 
combination thereof. In the absence of knowledge, which 
can only be obtained by some proposed study such as a 
randomized controlled trial (RCT), belief in the efficacy 
of an untested outcome becomes the only driver of a 
study, the final arbiter of opinion. Equipoise tips its hat 
only at its own peril to the understanding that it would 
be immoral to perform an experiment or piece of research 
on people unless one expected to improve the overall 
outcome for humanity or some subgroup thereof. It is also 
immoral not to do that which, in one’s opinion, will be 
the best thing for the individual patient. Knowledge can 
only be achieved through experiment. Belief, therefore, 
must be the basis for experiment, as equipoise requires a 
balance of opinion, by definition the totals of knowledge 
and belief, between the arms of a study. Therefore, it is 
only through belief that one can justify the acquisition 
of knowledge. Moreover, the more knowledge‑based arm 
of any moral study must always be the control arm, as it 
constitutes the known. Finally, too strong a belief in the 
efficacy of a novel therapy should also preclude an RCT 
as inherently immoral, as it would preclude the provision 
of the optimal treatment to a portion of the research 
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population, in the opinion of the clinical researcher. The 
first users of Penicillin did not withhold the drug awaiting 
the results of an RCT with satisfactory P values. These 
tensions are irreducible. If progress is to be guided by 
anything more than closely followed fortuitous accident, 
belief must trump knowledge, and certainty will always 
follow behind. Even then, the early follow‑up of such 
a fortuitous accident still requires belief, rather than 
knowledge.
REASON
In essence then, in a research context, perceived equipoise 
is the argument that “my belief trumps my knowledge”: 
an unenviable position for a rationalist/scientist to have 
to take! And I would further argue that it is necessarily 
the opinion of the individual researcher, rather than 
some inchoate “community,” which ultimately leads that 
individual to action.
Evidence‑based medicine is clearly the ideal circumstance 
in the abstract. And the authors are indeed correct that 
much of current medicine is not based in RCTs. And 
the history of medicine is littered with opinions based 
on beliefs, which have subsequently been proven wrong 
as “true” knowledge advanced. But thousands of years 
of accreted knowledge should not be abandoned, as the 
inference engine of the human mind routinely judges 
correctly. And the “true” knowledge accumulated walking 
the border of moral hazard can also prove incomplete, or 
flatly wrong. Errors, well intentioned or otherwise, and 
uncertainties inevitably abound.
It is not clear to me that the authors have fully made 
their case that the instant discussed research protocols 
overstepped this moral border, though they make a 
compelling case that increased scrutiny is critical. But 
their passionate cri de coeur is an important, coherent, 
and timely warning of the hazards inherent in any 
incautious research where vulnerable individuals have 
entrusted their health to others, particularly across wide 
geographic, cultural, or socioeconomic boundaries.
There is no doubt that this trust has been egregiously 
violated in the past, and remains at serious risk. In 
the previously mentioned Willowbrook study of the 
treatment of hepatitis, direct consent by the population 
was impossible due to the cognitive compromise of the 
patient population. Indirect consent might have been 
acceptable based on their high rates of infection, but 
deliberate direct exposure of the patients to Hepatitis 
in the presence of alternative housing was certainly 
unethical. Also in the U.S., the Tuskegee experiments 
of observation of patients with untreated syphilis 
violated any possible ethical physician’s norm, when 
known effective treatment was available. Further, as a 
prior IRB member and bioethics chairman at a major 
university medical school, I can attest to the need to 
restrain and sculpt the enthusiasm of some researchers, 
and to remind them of their primary clinical obligations, 
and the need for informed consent as a voluntary contract 
between partners rather than a technical fig leaf covering 
undisclosed risks.
The use of untreated control groups in both the instant 
trials discussed by the authors raises similar questions, 
though access to a “higher” level of treatment may or 
may not have been otherwise available to the studied 
populations. It also emphasizes the extent to which 
health and public policy are inextricably intertwined, 
from locally to internationally.
Within the limits of our understanding, in every 
house where I come I will enter only for the good of 
my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional 
ill‑doing, is as valid a guiding principle now as it was 
in the time of Hippocrates, 2400 years ago. Medical 
research must always be subservient to the obligation 
to the patient. The authors are to be commended for 
raising and vigorously exploring these deep and fraught 
issues.
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